I. Introduction
For several decades, high inflation has been the main threat to monetary stability. The successful disinflation and resulting low inflation rate in many countries, together with the problematic situation in Japan, has brought the potential threat of deflation and a binding zero bound on nominal interest rates (a liquidity trap) into focus. The zero bound on the central bank's instrument rate would seem to prevent expansionary monetary policy in situations when it would be mostly needed. Many papers have recently discussed the consequences of the zero bound and a liquidity trap, how to avoid these and how to escape if trapped, often with specific references to Japan, where the threat of deflation and a binding zero bound has been a reality for several years.
1
There seems to be considerable agreement on how to avoid the zero bound and a liquidity trap. Many papers recommend an explicit positive symmetric inflation target (say 2 percent per year). Many central banks already implement such inflation targets. Another possibility is an upward-sloping price-level target path (say rising at 2 percent per year), although there is as yet no central bank that implements explicit price-level targeting (with either a flat or an upward-sloping price-level target path).
2
Svensson (1999b) also suggests that prudent central banks should prepare a set of emergency measures, to be used at preannounced indications of an immanent liquidity trap. These emergency measures would include unorthodox open-market operations in long government bonds and corporate bonds, direct lending to the private sector, foreign-exchange interventions, and fiscal and monetary cooperation including a money-financed fiscal expansion involving government expenditure complementary to private consumption.
There seems to be less agreement on how to escape from a liquidity trap if already trapped. Krugman (1998) has suggested that the central bank should make a commitment to future monetary expansion and has proposed an inflation target for Japan of 4 percent per year for 15 years. The idea is that this would induce inflation expectations that would reduce the real interest rate (even if the nominal interest rate is at the zero bound) and thereby stimulate the economy out of the liquidity trap. A problem with this suggestion is that a mere announcement of a future monetary expansion or an inflation target need not be credible with the private sector and therefore not affect inflation expectations, in the absence of any commitment mechanism or any action supporting the announcement. Furthermore, the high inflation target for Japan for 15 years may not be credible, since the Bank of Japan might be tempted to reduce the inflation target to a more conventional level (say 2 percent) once the economy has escaped from the liquidity trap. Posen (1998) , analyzing the economic situation of Japan, suggests a fiscal expansion and a more moderate inflation target of 3 percent that is reduced to 2 percent after a few years, but he recommends avoiding a yen depreciation. Meltzer (1999a Meltzer ( , 1999d recommends increasing the monetary base, with reference to a real-balance effect on aggregate demand and that increased supply of money will affect a number of other asset prices and interest rates in an expansionary direction, even if short nominal interest rates are zero, especially depreciating the domestic currency. A problem with a real-balance effect on aggregate demand in a liquidity trap is that if the private sector is already satiated with liquidity, increasing liquidity is unlikely to affect consumption.
3 Furthermore, in a liquidity trap, short nominal government bonds and money are (close to) perfect substitutes, and open-market operations increasing private holdings of money and reducing private holdings of short government bonds would have little effect. Accordingly, Meltzer recommends open-market operations in other assets than short government bonds, for instance, long government bonds or foreign-currency government bonds, to reduce long bond rates and depreciate the domestic currency, relying on the assumption of imperfect substitutability between these assets and money/short bonds, but without any discussion of the degree of imperfect substitutability and how large open-market operations would be needed.
The reason why nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero is that an alternative to investing in short government bonds is simply to hold cash at zero interest rates. Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999) and Goodfriend (1999) discuss a more exotic way of eliminating the zero bound by introducing a carry tax, a tax on holding reserves and currency. This would allow negative nominal interest rates in equilibrium, and allow the central bank to achieve the desired stimulating negative interest rate. Although it seems technically feasible to introduce a carry tax for commercial-bank reserves in the central bank, introducing a carry tax on currency requires technological innovations (electronic chips in the notes, for instance) and also implies the inconvenience of notes circulating with the same nomination but trading at different discounts.
McCallum (1999) has recommended foreign-exchange interventions to depreciate the currency and, in this way, stimulate the economy when the interest rate is zero. His argument either ignores uncovered interest parity or relies on a portfolio-balance effect, whereby the relative supply of domestic-and foreign-currency denominated assets affects the foreign-exchange risk premium and thereby the exchange rate. Although huge foreign-exchange interventions are likely to affect the exchange rate (if not because of a portfolio-balance effect, at least because of the expectations of future depreciation they may induce), a problem with this argument is that the size of the portfolio-balance effect is controversial and most empirical work on the effect of sterilized foreign-exchange interventions indicates that the portfolio effect is small or
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The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap even negligible. McCallum does not provide any calculations of the magnitude of the foreign-exchange interventions that would be needed to significantly depreciate the yen. Bernanke (1999) , analyzing the situation in Japan, discusses several potential remedies, especially a relatively high inflation target in the 3-4 percent range for a number of years to undo the "price-level gap" created by several years of zero or negative inflation, aggressive foreign-exchange interventions to depreciate the yen, and money-financed fiscal transfers. Svensson (1999b) suggests that all the emergency measures prepared in advance by prudent central banks (see above) should be used, in the hope that some of these would work. In particular, a temporary exchange-rate peg is discussed ([1999b] , section 5.3):
Could the central bank peg the exchange rate and this way escape the liquidity trap? Such pegging would involve a commitment to arbitrarily large nonsterilized foreign-exchange interventions, buying foreign exchange and selling domestic currency at the pegged rate. Again, for such pegging to succeed, market expectations of future appreciation would have to change. If they do not change, huge foreign-exchange interventions could be absorbed by the foreign-exchange market. The question is then, in such a game of attrition, who will blink first, the market or the central bank? Compared to the usual speculative attack on a pegged exchange rate to force a devaluation, the central bank does not risk running out of foreign-exchange reserves; instead it just has to create more domestic currency. The fact that a commitment to a pegged exchange rate is immediately verifiable and the technical possibility to always create more domestic currency may make the commitment more credible in the short run than a commitment to an inflation target when interest rates have reached zero. It cannot be excluded that an exchange-rate peg can serve as a temporary emergency measure, an intermediate step towards fulfilling an inflation target.
Thus, this argument relies on a commitment by the central bank to buy and sell unlimited amounts of foreign exchange at the given pegged exchange rate. In particular, it does not rely on any portfolio-balance effects; instead, it relies on the change in private-sector expectations of future exchange rates brought about by the commitment to unlimited interventions at the pegged exchange rate. This paper expands on this idea and argues that there is indeed a safe and foolproof way of escaping from a liquidity trap in an open economy, namely, (1) announcing an upward-sloping price-level target path (that is, corresponding to a positive long-run inflation target) above the current price level; (2) announcing that (a) the currency will be devalued and the exchange rate pegged at a level corresponding to a real depreciation relative to a steady-state level, and (b) the peg will be abandoned in favor of price-level targeting (or inflation targeting) once the price-level target path has been reached; and (3) just doing it.
4
It is argued that this will jump-start the economy by (1) a real depreciation of the domestic currency relative to a long-run equilibrium level; (2) a lower long real interest rate (since there must eventually be a real appreciation of the domestic currency, and expected real appreciation of the currency is associated with relatively low short and long domestic real interest rates); and (3) increased inflation expectations (since, with the exchange-rate peg, expected real appreciation is associated with expected domestic inflation). The output gap will increase because of (1) and (2), and deflation will turn into inflation because of (1), (3), and the increased output gap. The economy will find itself out of the liquidity trap (a credible peg will be associated with a positive short nominal interest rate). The price level will rise and eventually reach the price-level target path, after which the peg will be abandoned.
The proposal acknowledges the crucial role of private-sector inflation expectations and includes a concrete way for the central bank of affecting those expectations. It handles the credibility problem associated with Krugman's proposal, in that it specifies what the central bank should do and not just what it should say, and by giving the central bank an arena, the foreign-exchange market, where it can quickly demonstrate its resolve to the market by success in pegging the exchange rate. In particular, a price-level target path is a more precise way of undoing the "price-level gap" caused by several years of zero or negative inflation than the high inflation target suggested by Krugman (1998) and Bernanke (1999) . The price-level target path allows inflation to be higher first and lower later, thereby providing an "anchored expansion," indeed better anchored than the variable inflation target suggested by Posen (1998) . By including the price-level target path, the proposal makes the temporary peg consistent with desirable long-run inflation expectations. It differs from McKinnon's (1999a McKinnon's ( , 1999b proposal of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan to stabilize the yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate, by the initial real depreciation and the temporary use of the peg (and by being unilateral). The proposal is consistent with Meltzer's (1999d) and McCallum's (1999) proposals to depreciate the currency, but it does not rely on the somewhat controversial magnitude of a portfolio-balance effect. Instead, it relies on affecting exchange-rate expectations via a commitment to the exchange-rate peg, regardless of the magnitude of any portfolio-balance effect; in case there is no portfolio-balance effect, it is consistent with uncovered interest parity.
5 Furthermore, in contrast to these proposals, my proposal provides a precise framework, the peg, for the depreciation, and for abandoning the peg in favor of the long-run inflation or price-level target. Indeed, it appears to be a foolproof way for an open economy in general, and Japan in particular, of escaping from a liquidity trap.
Chapter II discusses the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in an open economy, with and without the zero bound, as a background to the proposal. Chapter III presents the foolproof way of escaping from a liquidity trap in some detail. Chapter IV contains some conclusions for Japan. The appendix contains some technical details.
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The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap 5. Thus, no portfolio-balance effect is assumed in the model used below. However, as discussed in Appendix 2, one interpretation of the equilibrium resulting from the temporary peg is that the corresponding commitment to unlimited foreign exchange interventions poses a threat of huge interventions in support of the peg. At such huge interventions, a portfolio-balance effect would realistically appear and affect the exchange rate. This threat then affects exchange-rate expectations and supports the temporary peg, and a portfolio-balance effect need not be observed at the moderate interventions that occur in equilibrium.
II. The Transmission Mechanism in an Open Economy
In order to discuss the effect of monetary policy actions when the zero bound is binding, we need to specify the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in general, and with the zero bound in particular. Several similar models of monetary policy in an open economy have been presented. 6 Here, I use a simplified variant of a model derived and discussed in detail in Svensson (2000b) and ([1998] , appendix).
7 The main characteristics of the transmission mechanism in this and similar models are as follows:
(1) Domestic inflation (increases in the general price level of domestically produced goods and services) depends positively on expected future domestic inflation (the inflation-expectations channel to domestic inflation) and marginal cost of the production. Marginal cost, in turn, depends positively on the output gap (the aggregate-demand channel to domestic inflation) and the exchange rate (via imported intermediate inputs; the exchange-rate channel to domestic inflation). (2) Consumer price index (CPI) inflation depends positively on domestic inflation and inflation in imported final goods and services. The latter depends positively on the rate of domestic-currency depreciation (the direct exchangerate channel to CPI inflation). (3) The output gap (the difference between output and potential output) depends, via domestic aggregate demand, negatively on the long real interest rate (the real-interest rate channel to aggregate demand) and, via the relative price between domestic and foreign goods, positively on the real exchange rate (the exchange-rate channel to aggregate demand). (4) The long real interest rate depends positively on expected future short nominal rates (the central bank's instrument rate) and negatively on expected future domestic inflation. The main property used in the development of the foolproof way of escaping from a liquidity trap in Chapter III is that, everything else equal, the output gap increases from (1) a real depreciation of the domestic currency and (2) a reduction in the long real interest rate. Domestic inflation increases from an increase in the output gap, (1), and (3) an increase in private-sector expectations of future domestic inflation. Thus, any open-economy model with the above rather uncontroversial characteristics will do.
The model of Svensson (2000b) also introduces somewhat realistic relative lags in the effects of monetary-policy actions on output and inflation as well as additional inertia in these variables. These lags imply that expectations play an even more important role: current domestic inflation and output are predetermined, and only future domestic inflation and output can be affected by monetary-policy actions. Furthermore, it is not the current real exchange rate and current long real rate but the
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6. See Batini and Haldane (1999) , Benigno (1999) , Galí and Monacelli (1999) , Leitemo (1999) , McCallum and Nelson (1999) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) , Svensson (2000b), and Weerapana (1998) . 7. The model differs from that in Svensson (2000b) and ([1998] , appendix) in that the nominal variables and some of the real variables are not measured only as deviations from a steady-state or trend level and in that the zero bound is made explicit.
expected future real exchange rate and the expected future real interest rate that are of importance for private-sector decisions. The model above does not explicitly model a credit channel (see, for instance, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [1998] ) and the more controversial transmission channels involving direct aggregate-demand effects of money (see Meltzer [1999d] , Woodford [1999a] , and Nelson [1999] ), the effect of foreign-exchange interventions on the foreign-exchange risk premium (see McCallum [1999] ), and the price-gap or real-money-gap effects on inflation in P* models (see Hallman, Porter, and Small [1991] , Tödter and Reimers [1994] , Svensson [2000a] , and Gerlach and Svensson [1999] ). Indeed, the foolproof way of escaping a liquidity trap presented in Chapter III does not depend on the presence (or the absence) of those transmission channels.
8
Readers not interested in the more detailed description of the model and discussion of the transmission mechanism may prefer to skim the next few subsections or even jump directly to Chapter III.
A. An Illustrative Model of an Open Economy
The model has an aggregate-supply equation (Phillips curve) of the form
Here, for any variable x, x t +τ |t denotes E t x t+τ , that is, the rational expectation of x t +τ in period t + τ, conditional on the information available in period t. Furthermore,
denotes (log) domestic inflation in period t, where p t is the (log) prices of domestic (ally produced) goods. The variable y t is the output gap, defined as
where y t d is (log) aggregate demand (output) and y t n is (log) potential output (for simplicity, both are measured as deviations from a constant steady-state level, although the model could also be formulated in terms of deviations from a steady-state trend). Potential output is assumed to be exogenous and stochastic and follows
where the coefficient γ y n fulfills 0 ≤ γ y n < 1 and η n t +1 is a serially uncorrelated zeromean shock to potential output (a "productivity" shock). The variable q t is the (log) real exchange rate, defined as
where p t * denotes the (log) foreign price level, s t denotes the (log) exchange rate (in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency), and q is the steadystate level of the real exchange rate.
9 Finally, ε t +1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean "cost-push" shock. Thus, we have two distinct "supply" shocks, namely a productivity shock and a cost-push shock. The coefficients α π , α y , and α q are constant and positive; furthermore, α π is smaller than unity.
This supply function is derived in Svensson ([1998] , appendix) (along the lines of Rotemberg and Woodford [1997] ), from the first-order condition of an optimization problem and hence, with some microfoundations. Inflation depends on lagged inflation and previous expectations of the output gap and future inflation. It is similar to a Calvo-type (1983) Phillips curve in that inflation depends upon expectations of future inflation. It is similar to the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) Phillips curve in that inflation depends on both lagged inflation and expected future inflation (see also Estrella and Fuhrer [1998] ). Domestic inflation is assumed to be predetermined one period.
10 The term including q t +1|t in equation (1) represents the effect of expected costs of imported intermediate inputs (or resulting wage compensation).
Let ω be the share of imported goods in the CPI. 11 Then CPI inflation, π t c , fulfills
Here, π t f denotes domestic-currency inflation of imported foreign goods, which fulfills
is the (log) domestic-currency price of imported foreign goods, and
is foreign inflation. That is, for simplicity, I assume that there is no lag in the pass-through of import costs to domestic prices of imported goods.
9. Since there are no nontraded goods, the real exchange rate also constitutes the terms of trade. 10. In Svensson (2000b) , domestic inflation is assumed to be predetermined two periods in advance, in order to have a two-period lag in the effect of monetary policy on domestic inflation (and hence, a longer lag than for the output gap, see below). 11. The share of imported goods in the CPI is approximately constant for small deviations around a steady state. It is exactly constant if the utility function over domestic and imported goods has a constant elasticity of substitution equal to unity (that is, is a Cobb-Douglas utility function), as is actually assumed in Svensson (2000b). 12. Since there is no interest-rate component in the CPI, it is best interpreted as CPIX; that is, CPI inflation (and domestic inflation) are exclusive of any credit service costs. 13. There are obviously more realistic and less simplistic ways of modeling the pass-through of exchange-rate movements to domestic prices of imported final goods.
Aggregate demand for domestically produced goods is given by the aggregatedemand equation (expressed in terms of the output gap, equation [3] ),
where y * t is (log) foreign output (measured as a deviation from a constant steady-state level), all coefficients are constant and non-negative, 0 ≤ β y < 1, and η d t +1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean "demand" shock. The variable ρ t is defined as ∞
τ =0
where r t , the (short domestic-good) real interest rate, fulfills
where i t is the (short) nominal interest rate. The constant steady-state level of the real interest rate is denoted r > 0. The zero bound on the nominal interest rate implies that it fulfills
The nominal interest rate is (normally) the instrument of the central bank.
14 Thus, the variable ρ t is the sum of current and expected future deviations of the real interest rates from the steady-state level of the real rate. The sum enters in the aggregate demand, since the latter is the forward solution of an Euler condition involving the short real interest rate, cf. Svensson (1998) . The sum always converges in the equilibria examined below. The variable ρ t is (under the expectations hypothesis) related to the deviations from the steady-state level of a long real zero-coupon bond rate: consider the real rate r T t with maturity T . Under the expectations hypothesis, it fulfills
Hence, for a long (but finite) maturity T, the variable ρ t is approximately the product of the deviation from the steady-state level of a long real rate and its maturity,
The aggregate demand is predetermined one period in advance. It depends on lagged expectations of accumulated future real interest rates, foreign output, and the real exchange rate. The aggregate-demand equation is derived, from a first-order condition consistent with optimization and hence with some microfoundations, and 
15,16
The exchange rate fulfills the interest parity condition
where i * t is the foreign nominal interest rate and ϕ t is the foreign-exchange risk premium. The foreign-exchange risk premium incorporates any exogenous residual disturbances to the exchange rate, including changes in portfolio preferences, credibility effects, etc. In order to eliminate the potentially non-stationary exchange rate, I use equation (5) to rewrite this as the real interest parity condition in terms of the stationary real exchange rate,
Note that q t and ρ t are closely related. Solving q t forward and exploiting that q T approaches q when T → ∞, we have
1 -γ ϕ where the r * t ≡ i* t -π* t +1|t is the foreign real interest rate, r * is the foreign steady-state real interest rate, ρ* t is defined in analogy with equation (10), and I use equation (20) below as well as the fact that the steady-state domestic and foreign real interest rate will be related to the steady-state foreign-exchange risk premium, ϕ, according to
Thus, the real exchange rate is related to the negative difference between the domestic and foreign expected future deviations of the real interest rate from the steady-state real interest rate. For simplicity, I assume that foreign inflation, foreign output, and the foreignexchange risk premium follow stationary univariate AR(1) processes,
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15. There is an obvious similarity to the closed-economy aggregate demand function of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , except that a lagged long real coupon-bond rate enters in their function. 16. The natural output level enters in equation (9), because the equation is first derived for the level of aggregate demand. It is then expressed in terms of the output gap by subtraction of the natural output level. 17. Equation (15) may give the impression that the real exchange rate will have a unit root. This is not the case in equilibrium, however. All real variables, inflation rates and interest rates are then stationary. The nominal price level and exchange rate are nonstationary under inflation targeting with base-drift in the price level.
where the coefficients are non-negative and less than unity, the shocks are serially uncorrelated and zero-mean, and π* and ϕ are the constant steady-state levels of foreign inflation and the foreign-exchange risk premium, respectively. Furthermore, for simplicity, I assume that the foreign interest rate follows a Taylor-type instrument rule; that is, it is a linear function of foreign inflation and output,
where i * ≡ r * + π* (where r * is the constant steady-state foreign real interest rate) is a constant steady-state level of the foreign interest rate, the coefficients are constant and positive, and ξ* it is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean shock. These specifications of the exogenous variables are chosen for simplicity; obviously the exogenous variables may be cross-correlated in more general ways without causing any difficulties, and additional variables can be introduced to represent the state of the rest of the world.
18
Fiscal policy is not explicitly represented. It is implicitly assumed to be "Ricardian," so that the government's intertemporal budget constraint is an identity and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level does not apply.
B. The Loss Function, State-Space Form, and Equilibrium
A possible loss function corresponds to "flexible (domestic) inflation targeting" with a constant inflation target π (thus, stars denote foreign variables and hats denote target levels). This can be represented as a period loss
where λ > 0 is the relative weight on output-gap stabilization, and an intertemporal loss function where 0 < δ < 1 is a discount factor.
19
As shown in Svensson (1998) , the model can be written in a convenient state-space form. Let X t and Y t denote the (column) vectors of predetermined state variables and goal variables, respectively, let x t denote the (column) vector of forward-looking variables, and let v t denote the (column) vector of innovations to the predetermined state variables,
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where ′ denotes the transpose.
20 Then the model can be written
where A, B, and C are matrices or vectors of appropriate dimensions, W is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal (1, λ), i ≡ r + π is the steady-state level of the nominal interest rate, and Yˆ≡ (π, 0)′ is the vector of target levels (see Svensson ([1998] , appendix) for details 21 ). If the zero bound equation (12) is disregarded, the model is linear with a quadratic loss function. Then, the model is a standard linear stochastic regulator problem with rational expectations and forward-looking variables.
With forward-looking variables, there is a difference between the case of discretion and the case of commitment to an optimal rule. In the discretion case, the central bank each period minimizes the intertemporal loss function under discretion. Then, the forward-looking variables will, in equilibrium, be linear functions of the predetermined variables,
where the matrix H is endogenously determined. The equilibrium reaction function will be a linear function of the predetermined variables,
where the row vector f is endogenously determined and X -≡ (π ,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)′ denotes the steady-state levels of the predetermined variables.
22
The dynamics of the economy are then described by
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20. Intuitively, predetermined variables are determined by lagged variables and current exogenous shocks, whereas forward-looking variables (non-predetermined variables) are also affected by expectations of future forwardlooking variables. More rigorously, predetermined and forward-looking variables have one-period-ahead prediction errors that are exogenous and endogenous, respectively. 21. As mentioned above, the variant of the model presented here differs in that domestic inflation is predetermined one period ahead rather than two and that the steady-state levels of some of the variables are not set equal to zero. 22. In the commitment case, the optimal policy and the forward-looking variables also depend on the shadow prices of the forward-looking variables. Only the discretion solution is considered here. See Svensson and Woodford (1999) for the difference between discretion and commitment and its importance for inflation targeting.
as well as equations (27) and (28), where the matrix M is given by
where the matrices
are partitioned according to X t and x t . When the zero bound is taken into account and binding in some states of the world, the solution is no longer linear and must be found with nonlinear dynamic programming. In equilibrium, the forward-looking variables and the instrument will still be functions of the predetermined variables,
but the functions H (⋅) and F (⋅) are no longer linear.
C. The Transmission Channels
In summary, the model consists of the aggregate-supply equation, (1), the CPI equation, (6), the aggregate-demand equation, (9), the definitions of the sum of current and expected future real interest rates and the real interest rate, (10) and (11), real interest-rate parity, (15), and the equations for the exogenous variables: foreign inflation and output, the foreign-exchange risk premium, and the foreign interest rate, (18)- (21). Let us temporarily disregard the zero bound equation (12) and examine how the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is modeled here. The timing and the lags have been selected to provide somewhat realistic relative lags for the transmission of monetary policy. Consider a fall in the instrument, the short nominal interest rate i t , in period t. Current domestic inflation and the output gap are predetermined. Domestic inflation in period t + 1 will be sticky, and so are domestic inflation expectations, π t +1|t . Thus, the short real interest rate, r t , is affected, and falls.
23 The forward-looking variables ρ t and q t are affected by the current real interest rate but also by expected future real interest rates. Thus, the change in the whole expected
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23. In Svensson (2000b) and , πt+1|t is predetermined (because domestic inflation is assumed to be predetermined two periods ahead), so it affects rt one-to-one. In this model, πt+1|t is endogenous, and rt being increasing in it is an equilibrium property.
future path of the real interest rate matters. Assume that there is some persistence in the real rate fall, so that also the expected real interest rate in the near future falls. Then, ρ t falls and q t rises unambiguously. That is, the long real rate falls, and there is a real depreciation of the domestic currency. The real depreciation affects current CPI inflation π t c by equation (6), the direct exchange-rate channel to CPI inflation. Furthermore, ρ t +1|t falls, that is, the expected future long real rate falls, since expected future real rates fall. This increases the output gap, y t +1 , by equation (9), and hence increases aggregate demand (since aggregate demand is the endogenous component of the output gap). This can be called the real-interest-rate channel to aggregate demand. Furthermore, the expected future real exchange rate, q t +1|t , rises, which further increases aggregate demand one period ahead, which can be called the exchange-rate channel to aggregate demand.
Having traced the transmission channels to aggregate demand, we can examine the effect on domestic inflation one period ahead, π t +1 , in equation (1). In the Calvo model with inflation predetermined one period ahead that lies behind equation (1), domestic inflation in period t + 1 is determined by expectations in period t of inflation in period t + 2 and of marginal cost of production in period t + 1. Marginal cost is increasing in the output gap and, because imported-intermediate inputs are used in production, also in the real exchange rate. This is the reason y t +1|t and q t +1|t enter in equation (1). Thus, expectations of future increases in the output gap and real exchange rate from the expected fall in future real rates will lead to a rise in domestic inflation one period ahead. This can be called the aggregate-demand channel and the exchange-rate channel to domestic inflation (this can be said to constitute a marginal-cost channel to domestic inflation).
Finally, domestic inflation in period t + 1 also depends on expectations of domestic inflation in period t + 2, the term π t +2|t in equation (1). With persistence of the increase in inflation in period t + 1, inflation expectations for t + 2 rise, which then adds to domestic inflation in period t + 1. This is a direct expectations channel to domestic inflation in period t + 2. Naturally, this is not the only expectations channel; indeed, expectations channels abound in the transmission mechanism. We have seen above that ρ t +1|t and q t +1|t that enter into one-period-ahead aggregate demand in equation (9) are determined by accumulated expected future real interest rate. For a given future nominal interest rate, higher expected inflation also further decreases the expected future real rate, and hence, adds to the positive effect on aggregate demand. Indeed, expectations of future variables are crucial in the transmission mechanism.
Thus, by assumption, there is no lag in the monetary policy effect on CPI inflation, a one-period lag in the effect on aggregate demand, and a one-period lag in the effect on domestic inflation. Both VAR evidence and practical central-bank experience indicate that there is a shorter lag for the effect of a monetary-policy action on CPI inflation than for aggregate demand and domestic inflation. 
A credit channel and a direct money channel
The reader may have noticed that two potential transmission channels have not been modeled above, namely the credit channel and a separate money channel (for instance, a real-balance channel). A more elaborate model than the one underlying equations (1) and (9) with capital market imperfections would, as discussed in Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) , allow some firms' and consumers' borrowing possibilities to depend on their collateral (their balance sheet). These agents then face marginal borrowing costs exceeding the real interest rate referred to above, by an "external-finance premium." A reduction in the real interest rate would then increase the value of the collateral and thereby allow these agents to borrow at a lower external-finance premium and, in this way, additionally stimulate aggregate demand beyond the "pure" real interest rate effect discussed above, via a "balance-sheet channel." As detailed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) , improving balance sheets and increased credit flows may also have significant feedback and magnification effects; what these authors call the "financial accelerator." Since these effects would have the same signs as the "pure" real interest rate effects, they would, in the present simplified model, appear as larger coefficients on the real interest rate in equation (9) (although a more elaborate model would also introduce the initial financial position as an important state variable). Thus, in the present model, we take the credit channel to be included in the interest-rate channel to aggregate demand.
What about a direct money channel, for instance, a real-balance effect, to aggregate demand, in addition to the real interest-rate channel emphasized above? Naturally, money lies behind the transmission mechanism outlined below in the sense that central banks use open-market operations, especially repurchase contracts, to affect the amount of reserves supplied and, in this way, supply whatever reserves are demanded at the desired level of the instrument rate (an operating target), an overnight rate or a two-week repurchase rate, say. Given this, nothing is lost if we think of the instrument rate as the central-bank instrument and consider reserves to be demand-determined. A direct money channel, however, is something different than supplying reserves to achieve a particular level of the instrument rate; furthermore it involves broad money rather than the monetary base. Meltzer (1999d) and Nelson (1999) find some empirical support for a direct effect of real money on aggregate demand, in addition to the effect via the interest rate. Such an effect might be expected to show up as real money entering on the right side of equation (9), in addition to the other variables. However, as Woodford (1999a) emphasizes, to the extent that such an effect is interpreted as a wealth effect, the Euler condition used in deriving an aggregate-demand relation as equation (9) already incorporates any wealth effects (and, more generally, an intertemporal budget constraint).
25 As discussed by Woodford (1999a) , Nelson (1999), and McCallum (1999) , a direct money effect would arise, if real balances entered the representative agent's utility function and this utility function was not additively separable in consumption and real balances but had a positive cross-derivative. However, reasonable parameter values make any such effect so small that it can safely be disregarded. Meltzer
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(1999d) and Nelson (1999) emphasize that a direct effect of money may instead be a proxy for effects of other asset prices and interest rates than the short nominal interest rate, in particular long bond rates. However, if this is the reason for a direct money effect, including those asset prices and interest rates explicitly would seem more satisfactory. In our case, a long rate is already included via the variable ρ t , and, among other potential asset prices, at least the exchange rate is already included. For this reason, I choose not to include a separate direct-money channel to aggregate demand here.
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D. A Binding Zero Bound
Let us now consider the transmission mechanism when the zero bound equation (12) is taken into account and sometimes binds. Consider a situation where the zero bound is binding, in the sense that equation (28) implies a negative interest rate. This could, for instance, be the result of a series of negative demand shocks, which would call for expansionary monetary policy. If the usual instrument rate hits the zero bound, are there any other expansionary monetary policy actions available, or does monetary policy become ineffective and the central bank can only wait for better times? Several potential actions have been discussed in the literature (see the references in Footnote 1).
In the model above, it is ρ t and even ρ t +1|t that matter, rather than r t . If there are expectations of the nominal interest rate becoming positive in the future, the central bank may try to commit (as suggested by Orphanides and Wieland [1999] ) to maintaining the nominal interest rate at zero for longer than so far expected by the private sector. If this commitment is credible, this will shift expectations of future nominal rates downward and, at unchanged inflation expectations, expected future real rates downward to the same extent. This will reduce ρ t and stimulate the economy, everything else equal. However, absent any particular commitment mechanism, the commitment may not be credible and interest rate expectations not much affected.
Another action is further expansion of the monetary base, even when the short interest rate has fallen to zero, along the lines of Meltzer (1999c Meltzer ( , 1999d . But with a zero interest rate, short government bonds would be more or less perfect substitutes for reserves, so it is not clear that the private sector holding more money and less short government bonds would have much effect on other asset prices, including the exchange rate, unless a further expansion of the monetary base somehow affects inflation and exchange-rate expectations. Meltzer actually suggests
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26. Although admittedly, ρt, which is proportional to a long real rate, is determined by the simple expectations hypothesis in equation (10). This may not do justice to Meltzer and Nelson; they may have in mind risk premia, a term premium, for instance, that depend on real money via some portfolio-balance effect. 27. The so-called P * model is of a different category (see Hallman, Porter, and Small [1991] , Tödter and Reimers Svensson [2000a] ). Here, the price gap (the current price level less the price level in long-run equilibrium with an unchanged broad money stock) or, equivalently (with a change of sign), the real money gap (current real broad money less real broad money in a long-run equilibrium) enters into a traditional accelerationist Phillips curve in the place of the output gap. Although there is some empirical support for the P * model (see Hallman, Porter, and Small [1991] , Tödter and Reimers [1994] , and Gerlach and Svensson [1999] ), absent any microfoundations, this empirical support is difficult to interpret. As shown in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) , the real money gap and the output gap may be highly correlated, in which case the real money gap may enter as a proxy for the output gap. Therefore, I do not incorporate the P * model here.
open-market operations in other assets than short government bonds, in order to affect other asset prices, notably the exchange rate, via imperfect substitutability and portfolio-balance effects. One possibility is to do open-market operations in longer government bonds and, in this way try, to reduce long nominal and real interest rates (also suggested by Lebow [1993] ). If this works, it is either because this action reduces expectations of future nominal rates (under the expectations hypothesis) or because the relation between long and short rates involves risk premia, for instance, term premia (not included in the model above), that depend on outstanding stocks of long bonds via a portfolio-balance effect which can be exploited by the central bank. A third possibility is that such open-market operations increase inflation expectations and thus lower ρ t .
Naturally, r t and ρ t are not the only interest rates in a more elaborate setting, there is a whole spectrum of rates on corporate bonds and loans which are, in equilibrium, higher than the government bond rates because of some default risk. Thus, the central bank can, in principle, do open-market operations in corporate bonds and even open a window and lend directly to the private sector and thereby lower these rates and stimulate the economy. Since buying these bonds and making these loans means taking on some risk, the central bank is subsidizing this risk, so such actions have elements of fiscal policy in them. This can also be interpreted as an attempt to exploit the credit channel, by making some firms less dependent on their balance sheet to obtain loans and effectively lowering their external-finance premium.
Suppose current and expected future nominal rates cannot be further affected. If the central bank can increase the real exchange rate, that is, cause a real depreciation of the currency, it can still stimulate aggregate demand and inflation via the exchange-rate channels discussed above. Can the central bank affect the exchange rate when the nominal interest rate is zero? McCallum (1999) has argued that foreignexchange interventions can still affect the exchange rate, even if interest rates are zero. If the real exchange rate fulfills the interest-rate parity condition equation (15) with an exogenous foreign-exchange risk premium, ϕ t , as in equation (20), the real exchange rate can only be affected if ρ t is affected. If the central bank cannot affect current and expected nominal interest rates and expected inflation, it cannot affect ρ t and hence, not q t . However, suppose that the foreign-exchange risk premium ϕ t is partly endogenous and in the simplest possible case via a portfolio-balance effect affected by relative holdings domestic-and foreign-currency assets. Then, instead of equation (20) we might have
where b t and b* t are private (log) holdings of domestic-and foreign-currency denominated assets (including currency), respectively, ψ is a positive constant, and φ t is the exogenous component of the foreign-exchange risk premium. Then, foreign-exchange interventions that change the relative holdings of domestic-and foreign-currency denominated assets would affect the nominal and real exchange rate.
McCallum does not provide any calibration of the parameters or discuss the magnitude of interventions needed to affect the foreign-exchange risk premium, though. Again, aggressive foreign-exchange interventions might affect exchange-rate expectations and thus affect the current exchange rate, even in the absence of a portfolio-balance effect.
I have already referred to private-sector expectations and several expectations channels in the transmission mechanism several times. More specifically, if the central bank can somehow affect private-sector expectations of future inflation, everything else equal it will be reducing expected future real interest rates, reduce current and expected future real rates, increase (depreciate) the current and expected future exchange rate, increase actual future output, and increase actual future inflation. Krugman (1998) , who has strongly emphasized the role of expectations in getting out of a zero-bound situation (a temporary liquidity trap), has stated that the central bank should "credibly promise to be irresponsible." In less striking but more precise words, the central bank should attempt to restore inflation expectations to a sound positive level, more precisely to its inflation target, π > 0. That is, it should credibly promise to be responsible and bring the inflation back to its target.
Although any increase in private inflation expectations would be helpful in the short run, as emphasized by Posen (1998) it is advantageous to anchor inflation expectations to a suitable inflation target, that is, getting a credible inflation target. This should help avoid the opposite problem, getting too high and/or unstable inflation expectations, and risking a change to a high, unstable, and uncertain inflation rate. For Japan, Krugman (1998) has suggested a 4 percent inflation target for 15 years. A more moderate target may be more credible, in the sense of it being more desirable to keep it unchanged after having escaped from the liquidity trap. For Japan, Posen (1998) has suggested an initial inflation target of 3 percent, to be reduced to 2 percent within a few specified years.
An announcement is not likely to be enough, though. Setting up the whole inflation-targeting framework, with published inflation forecasts, transparent inflation reports, etc., is a more serious commitment. Acting accordingly, motivating the interventions, explaining the role of the emergency measures used, etc., is then a natural ingredient in building credibility for the inflation target and getting rid of deflationary expectations.
A price-level target (path) corresponding to a positive long-run inflation (say 2 percent), may, if it can be made credible, have special advantages. With a credible price-level target, some deflation would, by itself, increase expected future inflation, and hence reduce real interest rates and cause a real depreciation of the currency, even if nominal interest rates are unchanged. Furthermore, long-run inflation expectations would not depend on whether the price-level target will be missed in the near future.
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Although a number of potential monetary-policy actions have been suggested for a situation with a liquidity trap and a binding zero bound, there remains considerable uncertainty about how effective they might be, especially when they rely on portfolio-balance effects of uncertain magnitude. None of them seem to be foolproof ways of escaping from a liquidity trap. In particular, although a credible positive inflation target or a credible price-level target path would clearly be very desirable, and by itself stimulate the economy in a liquidity trap via the expectations channels, it is not clear how effective actions to establish such credibility would be, at least in the short run.
Fortunately, for an open economy, there seems to be a foolproof way of escaping from a liquidity trap.
III. A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap
Let us now consider an open economy in the above model in an initial liquidity trap. The zero bound is binding, so short nominal interest rates are zero. Expected domestic inflation is negative, so the real interest rate is positive. The economy is in recession and the current output gap is negative. Expectations and forecasts point to continued deflation and a negative output gap for some time ahead. The nominal interest rate is lower than in the rest of the world so, to the extent uncovered interest parity holds, the domestic currency is expected to appreciate. Flexible inflation targeting with a small positive inflation target and some weight on stabilizing output around potential output calls for a more expansionary monetary policy and a lower real interest rate, but the central bank is prevented from lowering its instrument rate by the zero bound.
A. The Proposal I would like to suggest that there is indeed a foolproof way of implementing a more expansionary monetary policy and escaping from such a liquidity trap. This involves introducing a price-level target path corresponding to a small positive long-run inflation target and jump-starting the economy by a devaluation of the currency and temporary exchange-rate peg. More precisely, according to this proposal a central bank that wants to escape from the liquidity trap should:
(1)Announce an upward-sloping price-level target path {pˆt } ∞ t =t0 for the domestic price level,
with the price-level target for the current period t 0 exceeding the current price level,
and with a small positive long-run inflation target (for instance, 2 percent per year),
(2a) Announce that the currency will be devalued and that the exchange rate will be pegged to a crawling exchange-rate target,
where the exchange-rate target s t is given by
That is, the central bank makes a commitment to buy and sell unlimited amounts of foreign currency at the exchange rate s t . The initial exchange-rate target after the devaluation, s t0 , is chosen such that there is real depreciation of the domestic currency relative to the steady state,
(recall that the domestic price level is sticky, so that in the short run, the real exchange rate moves one-to-one with the nominal exchange rate). The exchange-rate target then corresponds to a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency at the rate of the difference between the domestic inflation target and average foreign inflation, π -π*. That is, if π < π*, there is a nominal appreciation, and if π = π*, the peg is fixed instead of crawling.
(2b)Announce that, when the price-level target path has been reached, the peg will be abandoned, either in favor of flexible price-level targeting with the same target path, that is, with a period loss function given by
2 or in favor of flexible inflation-targeting with the same inflation target, that is, with a period loss function given by equation (22). Which alternative is announced would be determined by whether a price-level targeting without base drift of the price level or inflation targeting with such base drift is preferred in the long run.
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(3) Then, just do it.
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29. The central bank may also announce that it wants to shift to targeting the CPI level or inflation rather than domestic price level or inflation. Escaping from the liquidity trap is more easily discussed in terms of the domestic price level, though. 30. Flexible price-level targeting without base drift in the price level would correspond to the period loss function (equation [40] ) rather than equation (22). With such a loss function, the model can be expressed in the statespace form equation (24)- (26), with the vectors of predetermined variables, target variables, and target levels defined as
That is, the domestic price level and the price-level target are additional predetermined variables.
B. Why Would This Work?
Why would this work? The argument proceeds in several steps, to be explained in detail below: (1) It is technically feasible for the central bank to devalue the currency and peg the exchange rate at a level corresponding to an initial real depreciation of the domestic currency relative to the steady state. (2) If the central bank demonstrates that it both can and wants to hold the peg, the peg will be credible. That is, the private sector will expect the peg to hold in the future. (3) When the peg is credible, the central bank has to raise the short nominal interest rate above the zero bound to a level corresponding to uncovered interest rate parity. Thus, the economy is formally out of the liquidity trap. In spite of the rise of the nominal interest rate, the long real rate falls, as we shall see. (4) Since the initial real exchange rate corresponds to a real depreciation of the domestic currency relative to the steady state, the private sector must expect a real appreciation eventually. (5) Expected real appreciation of the currency implies, by real interest parity equations (15) and (16), that the long real interest rate is lower. (6) Furthermore, given the particular crawling peg equation (38), a real appreciation of the domestic currency will arise only if domestic inflation exceeds the inflation target. Therefore, the private sector must expect inflation to eventually rise and even exceed the inflation target.
(7) The economy is hence jump-started by (a) a real depreciation of the domestic currency, (b) a lower long real interest rate, and (c) increased inflation expectations. Via the transmission channels discussed in Chapter II, the output gap will rise because of (a) and (b). Inflation will increase above the inflation target by (a), (c), and the increase in the output gap, and thus induce a real appreciation of the domestic currency. (8) With actual inflation above the inflation target, the price level will eventually catch up with the price-level target path. (9) When the price-level target path has been reached, the peg will be abandoned, and monetary policy shifts to flexible price-level targeting or flexible inflation targeting, depending on what has previously been announced.
Let me explain this argument in more detail. With regard to step (1), it is indeed possible for the central bank to devalue the domestic currency and peg the nominal exchange rate at a level corresponding to a real depreciation relative to the steady state. The central bank will make a commitment to buy and sell unlimited amounts of domestic currency for foreign currency at the target exchange rate. Since the currency has been devalued so as to achieve a real depreciation relative to the steady state, the currency will be strong in the sense of there being appreciation pressure. Thus, the domestic currency will be in demand, and the central bank can always fulfill that demand by issuing enough volumes of domestic currency. The central bank's foreign-exchange reserves will rise, but this is not a problem in a situation when the central bank wants inflation and inflation expectations to pick up.
In contrast, a central bank defending a weak currency, in the sense of there being depreciation pressure, would be buying the domestic currency and paying with its foreign-exchange reserves, eventually risking running out of foreign-exchange reserves and having to float the currency. There is indeed a big difference between defending a strong currency and a weak one, since by issuing more domestic currency and allowing foreign-exchange reserves to grow without bounds, the strong currency can be defended indefinitely. There are many examples of central banks pegging a weak currency being overwhelmed by speculative attacks, and having to float because they have run out of foreign-exchange reserves or because the level of domestic interest rates needed to stop the onslaught are too costly to be credible.
31 In contrast, a central bank pegging a strong currency would only abandon the peg by choice, if the size of the foreign-exchange reserves and the stock of money become too inflationary or the low interest rate to counter the appreciation pressure is too expansionary and causes the economy to overheat. This is obviously not the situation for an economy in a liquidity trap. When inflation and activity starts picking up, the price-level will eventually hit the price-level target path, and the peg will be abandoned. The idea is that the price-level target shall be met before the economy has become dangerously overheated.
Note that the argument does not depend on any portfolio-balance effects of foreign-exchange interventions, in contrast to the argument of Meltzer (1999d) and McCallum (1999) , and thus, it is more general. Indeed, we can assume that there is no portfolio-balance effect and that uncovered interest parity equation (14) holds, with an exogenous or even zero foreign-exchange risk premium. As long as the central bank supplies an unlimited amount of domestic currency at the target exchange rate s t , arbitrage in the foreign-exchange market will ensure that this exchange rate is the equilibrium exchange rate.
32 Alternatively, as discussed in Appendix 2, one can think of the temporary peg as supported by a threat of foreignexchange interventions of huge volumes, at which a portfolio-balance effect would realistically appear and depreciate the currency. This threat excludes the possibility that the peg would fail.
With regard to step (2), if the central bank thus demonstrates that it can hold the peg, the peg will become credible. That is, private-sector exchange-rate expectations will fulfill
With regard to step (3), combining equation (41) with equation (38), we have that private-sector exchange-rate expectations fulfill
Together with equation (14), this implies that the equilibrium interest rate will no longer be zero but rise to fulfill
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31. See, for instance, Svensson (1994) for more discussion. 32. If there is a portfolio-balance effect and sterilized interventions are effective, the central bank will have a choice between nonsterilized interventions, which amounts to buying foreign-exchange reserves and paying in domestic currency; thus see the monetary base rise with the foreign-exchange reserves, or sterilized interventions, which amount to selling domestic bonds for the foreign-exchange reserves (that is, reducing domestic credit) and keep the monetary base constant. However, the central bank might run out of domestic credit, in which case it would have to switch to nonsterilized interventions. Since the central bank always has the option to use nonsterilized interventions by issuing more currency, it can always fulfill the demand for the currency.
and the zero bound is no longer binding (I assume that i * t + π -π* + ϕ t > 0). That is, when the peg becomes credible, if the central bank sets the interest rate equal to equation (43), domestic and foreign investors are indifferent between holding domestic-currency and foreign-currency denominated short bonds, and the central bank need no longer intervene on the foreign-exchange market to support the exchange-rate peg. Then, the monetary base will be demand-determined, at the interest rate given by equation (43). Appendix 1 supplies some further details on the establishment of the peg.
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At first, we might think that the rise in the nominal interest rate to equation (43) implies that the real interest rate has increased and monetary policy may not necessarily have become more expansionary, when the effects of both the real interest rate and the real exchange rate are taken into account.
34 As we shall see, however, increased inflation expectations dominate the rise in the nominal rate.
Indeed, because the initial real exchange rate corresponds to a real depreciation relative to the steady state, equation (39), a real appreciation of the domestic currency must eventually occur, and the private sector must expect it to eventually occur, step (4) above. Furthermore, by equation (16), we see that the real depreciation relative to the steady state implies a low ρ t relative to ρ* t . Thus, we have demonstrated step (5), that the long real interest rate is lower.
With regard to step (6), if the peg holds, by equations (5), (37), and (38), we have
For simplicity, let me temporarily take foreign inflation to be deterministic and constant, so that
(that is, I assume that γ * π = 0 and ε* t ≡ 0 in equation [18] ; the more general case with equation [18] and base drift in the foreign price level is discussed in Appendix 3). Then, we have
so a real appreciation of the domestic currency occurs only if domestic inflation exceeds the inflation target. When the peg is credible, equation (41), this means that the private sector must expect inflation to eventually exceed the inflation target,
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33. A rise in short and long nominal interest rates implies capital losses for holders of government bonds and corresponding gains for the government. If these losses are a problem, they can obviously be undone by adjustment of the coupon on government bonds. 34. Blinder (1999) , in his comments at the conference "Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation Environment," October 1999, in reference to an intervention from the floor by Dale Henderson suggesting a peg of the yen, observes that the nominal interest rate would then rise to the level of the foreign interest rate and concludes that the increase in the interest rate would imply a tightening of monetary policy.
for some τ ≥ 1, and step (6) has been demonstrated. Thus, in step (7), monetary policy is indeed expansionary, and the economy is jump-started by (a) a real depreciation of the domestic currency relative to the steady state, (b) a lower long real interest rate, and (c) increased inflation expectations.
With regard to step (8), we have already noted that a real appreciation (after the initial real depreciation) of the domestic currency implies that domestic inflation is higher than the inflation target. Thus, we know that the price level is approaching the price-level target path from below. Do we know that the price level will actually hit the price-level target path in finite time?
Suppose the exchange-rate peg would be maintained forever, and consider the steady-state domestic price-level path, {p¯t } ∞ t =t0 , that is consistent with the exchange-rate peg. It is given by
where I have used equations (8), (35), (37), and (45). We realize that if this steady-state price-level path is above the price-level target path,
the price-level target will be reached in finite time. Furthermore, from equations (35) and (49), we have
Thus, in order for equation (50) to be fulfilled, we must have
where the last inequality restates equation (36). Thus, the central bank wants the initial devaluation to cause a real depreciation relative to the steady state that is larger than the difference between the initial price-level target and the initial price level. The central bank can use the initial real depreciation relative to the steady-state level, q t0 -q, as a measure of the extent to which monetary policy is initially expansionary.
35 The difference between the price-level target and the initial price-level, pˆt 0 -p t0 , will be a measure of how much the economy is intended to inflate and expand before the price-level target is hit; that is, how much of the "price gap" caused by several years of zero or negative inflation that the central bank intends to undo. For a given initial depreciation relative to the steady state (q t0 -q), the price-level target will be hit sooner the smaller the difference pˆt 0 -p t0 . For a given difference pˆt 0 -p t0 , the economy will hit the price-level target sooner and with higher activity and inflation, the larger the initial real depreciation relative to steady state (q t0 -q). Clearly, a greater and quicker recovery from the liquidity trap runs the risk of overheating the economy before or as the price-level target is being hit.
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C. The Roles of the Price-Level Target Path and the Exchange-Rate Peg
The role of the price-level target path is to provide the best nominal anchor for the economy. Once credible, a price-level target implies that long-run inflation expectations are independent of inflation the first few periods, and even that a few periods of deflation increase inflation expectations for the near future, thus providing automatic stimulation of the economy. Furthermore, the uncertainty about long-run inflation falls with the horizon. The difference between the initial price-level target from the initial price level provides a measure of how much accumulated above-normal future inflation the central bank wants, that is, how much of the price gap it wants to undo. The price-level target path also provides a well-defined criterion for abandoning the peg when the latter has done its work. The role of the devaluation and peg corresponding to a real depreciation relative to the steady-state level is to jump-start the economy out of the liquidity trap. The difference between the initial real exchange rate after the devaluation and either the steady-state level of the exchange rate or the initial real exchange rate before the devaluation provides a measure of the magnitude of the jump-start, the initial boost to the economy.
D. The Central Bank's Balance Sheet
What are the balance-sheet consequences for the central bank of this policy? The initial devaluation will give the central bank a capital gain on (the domestic-currency value of ) its initial foreign-exchange reserves. While defending the peg in the initial phase, the central bank acquires foreign-currency denominated assets with a depreciated domestic currency, at the exchange rate s t0 . The extent to which the central bank's foreign-exchange reserves will rise initially depends on how long and how massive foreign-exchange interventions it takes to gain credibility for the peg. Once credibility has been achieved and the domestic interest rate has risen to equation (43), the money base will be demand-determined, and the domestic-currency return on foreign-exchange reserves equals equation (43). Thus, initial capital gain on the foreign-exchange reserves is the main balance-sheet consequence for the central bank. Appendix 1 provides further details on the initial currency flows.
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Obviously, the precise path of the economy can be characterized more explicitly, for instance by simulations of the model.
IV. Conclusions for Japan
The monetary policy of the Bank of Japan is very controversial. A number of economists, including Bernanke (1999 ), Blinder (1999 , Ito (1999) , Krugman (1998 ), McCallum (1999 , Meltzer (1999a Meltzer ( , 1999b Meltzer ( , 1999c Meltzer ( , 1999d , Mussa (1999 ) Posen (1998 ), and Svensson (1999b have suggested monetary policy actions and changes that may improve the economic situation in Japan. In particular, Bernanke, Krugman, Meltzer, and Posen have contributed more detailed arguments, criticism, and suggestions. In contrast, responses from the Bank, including Okina (1999a Okina ( , 1999c and Ueda (1999 Ueda ( , 2000 , have consistently defended a policy of not taking any actions beyond lowering the instrument rate to zero. The gist of the Bank of Japan's argument, as far as I can see, seems to be that, since one cannot be absolutely sure that any given policy action or change in the monetary policy regime will succeed in getting the economy out of the liquidity trap, it is safer not to try. The logic of this argument escapes me. Instead, as argued in Svensson (1999b) , it seems that prudent policy calls for trying a number of the suggested remedies (as long as they are not inconsistent), in the hope that some may work. Some of the Bank's arguments for no further action have pointed to potential negative consequences for its balance sheet and stated that the responsibility for foreign-exchange interventions rests with the Ministry of Finance. This seems like setting myopic bureaucratic interests and technical details above the welfare of the country, in a situation where leadership and resolve is called for (see Bernanke [1999] ). Now, there is an additional suggestion for the Bank of Japan (and the Ministry of Finance): a foolproof way of escaping from its liquidity trap and recession, namely combining a price-level target path corresponding to positive inflation with a devaluation of the yen and a temporary exchange-rate peg to jump-start the economy. Exchange-rate policy and monetary policy cannot be separated under free international capital mobility, since exchange rates and interest rates cannot then be set independently. Nevertheless, many countries, including Japan, have the inconsistent institutional setup that exchange-rate policy is the responsibility of the government, via the ministry of finance, rather than the responsibility of the central bank. For Japan, I understand that the Bank is not allowed to undertake independent foreign-exchange interventions in order to affect the exchange rate. Given this, the temporary exchange-rate peg required for the foolproof way of escaping a liquidity trap requires an explicit agreement between the Bank and the Ministry of Finance. When the welfare of the country is at stake, such an agreement should not be difficult to conclude.
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37. Since the net balance-sheet consequences for the Bank of Japan of the proposed way of escaping from the liquidity trap seem to be positive, they provide no reason for the Bank's objections. The Bank of Japan Law has the asymmetric provision that the Bank's profits are delivered to the government whereas losses are borne by the Bank (see Okina [1999a] ). Because of this, the Bank has resisted proposals to buy long-term government bonds, since it would suffer capital losses when long-term bond rates rise to normal levels (even though these losses would correspond one-for-one to government capital gains). It may be advantageous, as suggested by Bernanke (1999) , to revise the law to put the Bank on a fixed operating allowance and make the government the residual claimant of gains and losses to the Bank's balance sheet. Before such a revision, it would seem that an agreement with the Ministry of Finance on how to escape from the liquidity trap could also include a government guarantee Given the discussion in Okina (1999a Okina ( , 1999b Okina ( , 1999c and Ueda (1999 Ueda ( , 2000 , what objections might the Bank of Japan have to my proposal? The proposal of Krugman (1998) and others of a positive inflation target has been rejected by the Bank with the argument that the proposal does not in itself suggest any means for the Bank to achieve the inflation target. Regardless of the validity of this argument, it does not apply to my proposal of a price-level target path, since my proposal suggests a very specific means to achieve the price-level target, namely the temporary exchange-rate peg. With regard to the proposal by Meltzer (1999d) , McCallum (1999) and others to depreciate the yen, Okina (1999a Okina ( , 1999b Okina ( , 1999c emphasizes that it is the Ministry of Finance and not the Bank that is responsible for exchangerate policy, seems to agree that unlimited foreign-exchange interventions (in cooperation between the Bank and the Ministry of Finance) to achieve a target exchange rate would work, but warns that "given that the floating exchange rate system has prevailed among industrialized countries for quite a long time, any attempt at unlimited intervention to bring the foreign exchange rate back to something akin to a fixed exchange rate regime would be a grand experiment" ([1999b] , p. 196) (probably meaning "too grand an experiment"). This argument (again regardless of its validity) does not seem to apply to my proposal, since that is for a temporary devaluation and exchange-rate peg to achieve the price-level target and not a permanent shift to a fixed exchange-rate regime (as proposed by McKinnon [1999a McKinnon [ , 1999b ).
One possible objection to the proposal is that it is similar to a competitive devaluation, and that trading partners may have objections. First, one can observe that, due to equation (16), any monetary expansion that results in a lower long real interest rate must in equilibrium be associated with a real depreciation. Hence, if one objects to any real depreciation, one essentially objects to any monetary expansion. Second, jump-starting the Japanese economy should sooner or later increase Japanese demand for imports from the rest of the world. As is well known, the current account effects of a devaluation are generally ambiguous, with substitution and income effects of opposite signs. To most observers, it seems rather uncontroversial that Japanese, Asian, and world welfare would all be well served by an expansion of the Japanese economy.
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to cover any capital losses encountered by the Bank. To most observers, it of course seems bizarre if minor balance-sheet consequences (especially if they cancel between the Bank and the government) are allowed to stand in the way of the welfare of the country. 38. At the time of writing, the official view of the Bank of Japan is that the Japanese economy has improved to such an extent that any further monetary expansion is not needed, and it has just (defying practically all external advice, including IMF [2000] ) taken the very controversial action of raising the interest rate above zero, stating that "deflationary concern has been dispelled" (Bank of Japan [2000] ) without reference to forecasts of the CPI or GDP deflator and in spite of current deflation in these price indices.
APPENDIX 1: DEVALUING THE CURRENCY AND ESTABLISHING THE PEG
This appendix discusses the establishment of the temporary peg in some detail.
A. Before the Peg
In the initial situation, before the devaluation, we have a zero interest rate (i t = 0), a clean float, and, by equation (14),
where I for simplicity set the foreign-exchange risk premium equal to zero (ϕ t ≡ 0). That is, the currency is expected to appreciate at a rate equal to the foreign interest rate. The foreign-exchange market is in equilibrium and there are no foreignexchange interventions. The expected domestic-currency (one-period) return on foreign (-currency one-period) bonds equals the zero domestic-currency (one-period) return on domestic (-currency one-period) bonds. Let t 0 -denote the "beginning" of period t 0 , before the (unanticipated) announcement of the devaluation and the peg, so the initial exchange rate, s t0-, and exchange rate expectations, s t0+1|t0-, in the beginning of period t 0 fulfill
hence making the expected one-period domestic-currency return on foreign bonds equal to zero.
B. Initial Lack of Credibility of the Peg
Let t 0 denote the "middle" of period t 0 , after the announcement of the devaluation and the central bank's commitment to buy and sell unlimited amounts of foreign exchange at the exchange rate s t0 > s t0-. Suppose that the peg is not credible. More precisely, suppose that expectations of the period-t 0 + 1 exchange rate remain the same, so s t0+1 = s t0+1|t0-. Let the domestic interest rate be held at zero. Then the expected one-period domestic-currency return on foreign bonds at the exchange rate s t0 fulfills
so the expected one-period domestic-currency return on foreign bonds is less than the return on domestic bonds. Then there will be excess demand for domestic currency and excess supply of foreign currency. The central bank then intervenes and equilibrates the foreign-exchange market at the exchange rate s t0 by supplying the corresponding amount of domestic currency, thereby adding to its foreign-exchange reserves. Arbitrage among foreign-exchange traders ensures that the market exchange rate equals s t0 .
C. A Credible Peg and a Zero Interest Rate
Next, suppose that the peg becomes credible, when the central bank has demonstrated that it can fulfill the excess demand for domestic currency, so exchange rate expectations fulfill
for t ≥ t 0 . Suppose the interest rate is still held at zero. Then the expected one-period domestic-currency return on foreign bonds in period t 0 is by equation (38) given by
(where I again assume that π -π* + i * t > 0). Now, the expected domestic-currency return on foreign bonds has become positive and larger than the zero return on holding domestic bonds. Then foreign exchange will be in excess demand and domestic currency will be in excess supply. The central bank will have to intervene in the opposite direction, buying domestic currency and selling foreign exchange. It will hence be reducing its foreign-exchange reserves and it will have to raise the domestic interest rate before its foreign-exchange reserves are extinguished.
D. A Credible Peg and an Equilibrium Interest Rate
So, let the central bank raise the domestic interest rate to equal
for t ≥ t 0 (corresponding to equation [47] with ϕ t ≡ 0). Then the expected domesticcurrency returns on domestic and foreign bonds are equal, the foreign-exchange market is in equilibrium, and no foreign-exchange interventions are needed. The total demand for base money will, in the simplest case, be a function of and decreasing in the domestic interest rate and increasing in the volume of transactions in domestic currency, which we assume depends on the output level. Thus, we can write
where M t is the quantity of base money, P t ≡ e pt is the absolute domestic price level and
is the level of real domestic output (aggregate demand). More precisely, the central bank will be reducing the monetary base, via open-market operations or unsterilized foreign-exchange interventions, so as to increase the interest rate to the equilibrium level. Furthermore, the monetary base will equal the sum of the central bank's holding of domestic bonds (domestic credit), D t , and the domestic-currency value of its holdings of foreign-currency bonds (foreign-exchange reserves), R t (measured in foreign currency),
where S t ≡ e st is the absolute level of the exchange rate peg. Thus, although the total domestic monetary base, as usual under an exchange rate peg, is given to the central bank by equation (A.2) in equilibrium, the central bank can affect the composition of the monetary base into domestic credit and foreign-exchange reserves. For instance, in the previous stage (Section C)-when the peg is credible, the domestic interest rate is at zero (below the equilibrium level), the central bank is losing foreign-exchange reserves-the central bank can time the increase in the interest rate to the equilibrium level and stop intervening when the foreign-exchange reserves have fallen to a desirable level.
E. Announcing the Peg and Increasing the Interest Rate Simultaneously
Note that the central bank could in principle announce the peg and increase in the interest rate at the same time. The expected domestic-currency excess return on foreign bonds would then, at the pegged exchange rate, be given by
If the peg is not credible, so s t0+1|t0 < s t0+1 , the excess return is negative, there will be excess demand for domestic currency, and the central bank will intervene and increase its foreign-exchange reserves. At the same time, it will be doing open-market operations so as to reduce the overall monetary base and increase the interest rate. When credibility of the peg has been restored, it can stop intervening. How much foreign-exchange reserves have increased by then depends on how quickly credibility of the peg is achieved. This may come very quickly, in which case little foreignexchange interventions may be needed. Alternatively, the foreign-exchange reserves may have risen to a level larger than desirable, for instance, having replaced most of domestic credit, which will require unwinding of the reserves over time. For this reason, it may be preferable to follow the sequence (sections B to D) above, and only increase the domestic interest rate after credibility of the peg has been achieved.
F. Balance-Sheet Consequences
What are the balance-sheet consequences of the operations above? At the devaluation, the central bank makes a capital gain on its initial foreign-exchange reserves, (S t0 -S t0-)R t0-> 0. After the devaluation, any foreign-exchange interventions are done at the pegged exchange rate S t , and domestic credit and foreign-exchange reserves earn the same return. When the temporary peg is later abandoned, the central bank will make capital gains and losses if the exchange rate jumps then. The magnitude of the capital gains and losses are then affected by the volume of foreign-exchange reserves, which is under control by the central bank.
G. An Implicit Short-Run Flow Model of the Foreign-Exchange Market
Note that the discussion in sections A to E above is consistent with an implicit short-term flow model of the foreign-exchange market, where the volume of foreign-exchange intervention (the capital flow) is proportional to the expected excess return on holding foreign-currency bonds,
where ϕ t is the total foreign-exchange risk premium, the coefficient ψ t is positive and its dependence on t allows it to depend on the state of the economy (X t ), and φ t is an exogenous component of the total foreign-exchange risk premium.
APPENDIX 2: THE THREAT OF HUGE FOREIGN-EXCHANGE INTERVENTIONS
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Arguably, the temporary peg could fail in the following way. The central bank announces the peg and commits to buying and selling unlimited amounts of foreign currency at the pegged rate, s t . However, assume that there is in fact a large but finite upper limit to how much domestic currency the central bank is willing to issue, and that this is anticipated by the market. Then, one possible equilibrium would seem to be that the foreign-exchange market just absorbs the increased supply of domestic currency up to the central bank's limit, after which the central bank abandons the attempt to defend the peg. The domestic currency never depreciates to the desired peg and continues to float after the defense of the peg is abandoned. If domestic currency is a perfect substitute for foreign(-currency denominated) assets, the exchange rate would even follow exactly the same path, corresponding to equation (A.1), as followed if the central bank had never attempted to institute the peg. The foreign-exchange traders who bought the domestic currency at the pegged price have made a good deal (and the central bank has suffered a corresponding loss), but otherwise nothing has changed (obviously I am disregarding the fiscal consequences of the central bank's loss and the wealth effects of the traders' gains). If the limit is small, the above is of course the likely scenario. However, if the limit is very large, it is realistic at such volumes of currency issue that domestic currency would no longer be a perfect substitute for foreign assets and some portfolio-balance effect would appear and depreciate the domestic currency, in which case the investors who just bought domestic currency would suffer losses. This would seem sufficient to exclude the equilibrium where the peg fails because the large issue of domestic currency is just absorbed by the foreign-exchange market with no effect on the exchange rate. Given this, the threat and any portfolio-balance effects need never materialize, and uncovered interest parity holds in the equilibrium with the temporary peg.
The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap
I have benefited from comments by Michael Woodford on this issue.
That is, the initial devaluation should take into account the expected foreign price-level increase in excess of that corresponding to average foreign inflation. This excess foreign price-level increase is measured by the term
Note that there is a more sophisticated crawling (and drifting) peg that compensates for the base drift in the foreign price level. This would instead of equation (38) be
With p* t given by equation (A.3), this implies
Thus, this crawling and drifting peg differs from the crawling peg equation (38) by the last two terms in equation (A.4) . With this peg, we would again have equations (46), (47), and (49), and no drift is introduced into p¯t and p t during the peg.
APPENDIX 4: STICKY INITIAL DEFLATION
I assume that the economy is initially in a liquidity trap with deflation, π t0 < 0. Given the dependence of inflation on lagged inflation in equation (1), the deflation is sticky, and even if the temporary peg immediately becomes credible, and the economy is jump-started, deflation may continue for a few periods. Furthermore, it may take a few additional periods before inflation is above the long-run inflation target, π. During those periods, by equation (46), the real exchange rate is depreciating further, increasing the expansionary effect of the real exchange rate on the output gap in equation (9) and inflation in equation (1). While there is deflation and expected deflation, because the nominal interest rate has been increased from zero to equation (47), the short real interest rate will be higher in the first few periods. This might seem to be contractionary. However, the aggregate-demand relation (derived from a forward-looking first-order condition in Svensson ([1998] , appendix) implies that it is the long real interest rate, corresponding to ρ t , that matters for aggregate demand. This long-real interest rate depends on the degree of real depreciation relative to a long-run equilibrium, equation (16). Thus, a few periods of deflation and further real depreciation lowers the long real interest rate further. Even though the first few periods' short real interest rates increase, future real interest rates decrease more due to increased inflation, so the net effect on the long real interest rate is a decrease.
Comment
GLENN STEVENS Reserve Bank of Australia
It is a remarkable feature of the times in Japan that the notion of the liquidity trapa concept originating in the 1930s (though regarded by its creator as not of practical relevance to that time)-should be the motivating theme of so many papers in the past couple of years. Lars Svensson's paper represents an innovative further step in this literature.
The recent debate about Japanese monetary policy appears to have gone roughly as follows. First, short-term interest rates have been pushed down, eventually to zero, as the Bank of Japan (BOJ) fired all the conventional monetary policy bullets in the face of a chronically weak economy suffering the after-effects of the bubble period of the late 1980s and early 1990s. With the economy remaining weak, a discussion then ensued about whether this was all monetary policy could do, or whether more could be done. Could monetary policy, by adopting "quantitative" techniques-purchasing more financial assets and increasing the quantity of reserves in the system-do more to stimulate the economy?
The answer to this which has been offered by the BOJ has been, as I understand it, that they have already expanded their balance sheet greatly, and that banks already have very substantial excess reserves at the central bank. Furthering this process simply leads to even greater excess reserves, but no increase in broader measures of money and credit (and obviously no decline in short-term interest rates) and hence little or no stimulus to production or prices through the conventional channels. In this view, policy has done all that can be done, short of some very unorthodox activities indeed.
At this point, the next idea advanced was to announce the pursuit of an inflation target. Paul Krugman is most prominently associated with this suggestion. Such a target, if credible, provides a way of increasing inflation expectations and hence reducing the real interest rate, without the nominal interest rate needing to decline. The problem pointed out with this idea is that the target cannot be credible unless there is a clear way of delivering the inflation being targeted. Short of some mechanical control over prices, the usual way of building credibility is to move some policy instrument in a way consistent with the announced intention. By definition, this is not possible in Japan if the interest rate is the instrument. A further possible problem is that the targeted inflation rate might have to be fairly high to get the real interest rate low enough in the short term-a target of 0-2 percent might not be high enough. Hence the idea that the BOJ should "credibly commit to be irresponsible."
Svensson's paper takes up the debate at this point. He observes, as have McCallum and others, that even if the "orthodox" interest rate channel is exhausted, for an open economy there is an additional channel through which monetary policy can work: the exchange rate. Furthermore, Svensson argues that use of this channel in a particular way can give the credibility which seems to be missing in the mere announcement of an inflation target.
Svensson suggests that the central bank in the liquidity trap, and which has seen a fall in its price level, should do the following:
(1) Announce a price level target, with the target level higher than the current level, and sloping up over time. Eventually, this becomes a conventional inflation target, but in the short term potentially allows higher inflation than the central bank would like to allow in the long run. (2) Announce a devaluation of the exchange rate to a level at least as far below the current exchange rate as the target price level is above the current price level, and then peg the nominal exchange rate at that level. (3) Intervene in unlimited quantities to hold the nominal exchange rate at that level. The peg is credible because the central bank's capacity to sell its own currency is unlimited. For the real exchange rate to return to its (assumed) initial equilibrium level, domestic inflation must exceed foreign inflation. The expectation of that future inflation lowers real interest rates and stimulates growth. No one will disagree with the general idea that one can generate inflation in an open economy by depreciating. I would also think that a policy goal of trying to reflate Japan's price level might find some agreement-though this seemed to be unclear in yesterday's discussion. In ending inflation, we do not usually insist on unwinding earlier excesses in the price level, but in ending deflation we would surely want the price level to recover. The proposal also has the attraction that it outlines a way, at least in principle, of making sure that a reflation policy is not a "slippery slope" to permanently high inflation. The importance attached to expectations, key in Svensson's paper, is also welcome-though the fact that those expectations are essentially generated out of the foreign exchange market will make many people nervous: market notions of long-run equilibrium exchange rates seem to be fairly weakly anchored, to say the least.
So this sort of proposal would stand a good chance of working well in a small, open economy. The Swedish experience in the 1930s is often quoted as a precedent for this approach. But Japan in 2000 is not Sweden in the 1930s. In thinking about the Japanese case, two questions arise: How open is Japan? And how small is it? In brief, the answer is "not very" in both cases.
Japan's trade share of GDP is low by the standards of OECD countries. The sum of exports and imports, as a ratio to GDP, is in fact the lowest in the OECD. Only the United States and the euro area have trade-to-GDP ratios nearly as low as Japan's (the individual European nations have quite high trade shares, but much of that trade is with other euro member countries). So a question mark arises over how effective exchange rate depreciation would be in practice as a way of generating inflation in Japan. It would help, but it may take some time for inflation from this source to drive a substantial rise in Japan's overall price level-or it may take quite a large depreciation to get it happening quickly.
The second question was how small is the Japanese economy. The answer is that it is considerably smaller than the United States or the euro area, but much bigger than any other economy one could name. It is certainly not considered to be a small economy in global trade. This matters. Genuinely small countries can devalue substantially, and outside of a few direct competitor countries, no one minds. If they notice at all, it would only be because such depreciations have often tended to be associated with some sort of international liquidity crisis for the country concerned.
Were Japan, on the other hand, to decide to implement Svensson's suggestion, and set about having a unilateral and substantial depreciation of the yen, we could expect that other countries would notice, and would care. I would suggest that the United States and Europe need to be in agreement with the course in question. If they were not, the new peg could not be fully credible. Would those countries agree? I leave it to others to speculate, simply observing that pegging the yen is likely to mean, in practice, pegging the U.S. dollar-yen rate. And everything hangs on the credibility of the peg. If it is not credible, Svensson's transmission mechanism tends to break down.
How large a depreciation would we be talking about? Svensson does not say, but let me give a few pertinent facts. The GDP deflator for Japan fell by about 4 percent between its peak in 1994 and the March quarter of 2000.
40 Suppose we set a price level target that would reverse all this, and then some, so that Japan's price level is targeted to rise by 10 percent. Svensson's equation q t0 -q > pˆt 0 -p t0 > 0 in his paper says that we need to depreciate the yen by more than 10 percent to achieve this. Suppose we depreciated it by 20 percent. Then the U.S. dollar-yen rate would be, instead of ¥105, about ¥130.
But remember that the U.S. dollar-yen rate has been as high as that within the past couple of years. Over the year to September 1998, it averaged ¥133, and it reached as high as ¥145 at one point. This did coincide with a small, temporary rise in the price level, but unless I missed something, that did not transform Japan's circumstances. It did not break the expectation of modest deflation. Presumably this was because it did not persist, and was not expected to do so-and it has to persist to give the effect Svensson is after. Expectations of a stronger yen appear to have been very entrenched-after a very long period of more or less continual trend appreciation. This would not be easy to break-which only emphasizes even more the need for the agreement of other major countries if the peg is to stand any chance of being credible. Two other practical points in passing: the size of intervention needed may be very large indeed by any past standard. Published data suggest that the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) has accumulated US$100 billion over the past year or so when the U.S. dollar-yen rate has been between ¥100 and ¥110. One can only imagine the size of transactions that might be required to hold a higher dollar-yen rate. Second, it is important to note that in Japan it is the MOF which owns and deploys foreign reserves, not the central bank. So there is an issue of coordination between policy authorities. These problems can be ignored in theoretical analysis, but are often important in practice.
So while a small open economy can indeed generate reflation by devaluation, Japan is not all that open, and not that small. Hence I have less confidence than Svensson that this course of action is the "foolproof " answer to Japan's problems. That is not to say that it would not help or that it should be ruled out-far from it. But it is not foolproof.
It may be that, with Japan showing signs of recovery now, current policies will be seen as doing the trick, so more adventurous ideas will be put back on the shelf. I suspect, however, that should the liquidity trap intensify, we would have to look back to domestic Japanese policies for a major part of the answer to the problems.
The problems for fiscal policy are well known. Japan has a high ratio of public debt to GDP, and an aging population. As for "unorthodox" monetary measures, it is argued that more open market purchases of financial assets will have little expansionary effect. Other suggestions would be for direct purchases of other assets or, in extremis, goods and services. The objection will be made that these would expose the central bank to risks outside its usual mandate, and/or that they really amount to fiscal policy-not monetary policy.
Perhaps what this means is that there is a policy coordination issue. "Conventional" monetary policy-via interest rates-has run its course, and "conventional" fiscal policy may be hampered because of the financing constraint. But a fiscal boost financed by monetary expansion might well provide a boost for the economy in a way that neither policy alone could manage. At the same time, there would also be a need to ensure that once the short-term emergency is past, the unorthodox measures did not become normal, and that perceptions of the BOJ's independence and its commitment to long-term price stability were not undermined. Achieving the right mix-if it is feasible at all-would be no easy task.
In conclusion, I think Svensson's paper makes a valuable contribution by reminding us that for an open economy, monetary policy can look to the exchange rate as a channel of influence, so that we need not necessarily despair that policy is completely lacking in effect even if interest rates cannot be pushed lower. And it does so in a rigorous model, highlighting the undoubtedly crucial role of expectations, and with an eye to reconciling short-term and long-term needs.
But I think Svensson claims too much when he says it is foolproof, if for no other reason than that I doubt that Japan can unilaterally and sustainably devalue the yen by enough to make the difference needed, without there being agreement by other major countries. This might or might not be forthcoming, but it would be a necessary condition for the process outlined by Svensson to work.
More generally, if two years from now we are still talking about liquidity traps, I think the search for solutions may, while not ignoring exchange rate channels, turn mostly back to issues of domestic policy, and to issues of policy coordination in particular.
Comment
JOB SWANK The Netherlands Bank
Lars Svensson has written a topical and thought-provoking paper, which claims to offer a "foolproof way of escaping from a liquidity trap." Nevertheless, having gone through the various equations contained in the paper, I am still left with some doubt, which centers around the issue of whether the proposed way out of a liquidity trap will always work, whatever the conditions or the monetary transmission mechanism may be. I shall deliver my comment as much as possible within the context of the model presented in the paper, which I have read with great pleasure. The analytical framework contains sufficient realistic elements to warrant a meaningful discussion of the matters at stake. I am not sure that the results of the model are equally valid when monetary transmission (also) proceeds through channels other than interest rates, as the author seems to suggest. My intuition says that the possible existence of an independent money or credit channel requires more than what is contained in the model, especially when interest rates have reached the zero bound (real-balance effects, for example). In this respect, the analysis does not seem to do full justice to the recommendations made by Allan Meltzer and others during this conference. But this aspect is not relevant to my own remarks. Furthermore, for the sake of argument, I shall stick with Svensson to the presumption that the Japanese economy finds itself in a liquidity trap, indeed. In order to present my points in the perspective of the model, I shall use some simple equations borrowed or derived from the paper.
There are essentially two channels of monetary transmission in the model: (1) the real long-term interest rate (r T t ) with finite maturity T, and (2) the real exchange rate (q t ). The expectations of both variables, in deviation from their constant steady-state levels (r and q, respectively), enter into the aggregate-demand equation:
with expectations formed in period t, and with R representing all other influences. There are two instruments: (1) the short-term interest rate (i t ), and (2) foreigncurrency interventions. With a credible exchange rate target (or target path), these instruments are interdependent in that one of both has to adjust in order to establish interest parity, which is imposed on the model:
where i * t is the foreign counterpart of i t , s . e t +1 denotes expected nominal depreciation, and ϕ t is the foreign-currency risk premium.
The gist of the proposed recipe is twofold: (1) an announced price-level target path, and (2) an announced target path for the nominal exchange rate. This crawling peg leads off with a devaluation of the home currency, supported by unlimited foreign exchange interventions, and is maintained until the real exchange rate has changed just enough to have brought the economy on the price-level target path. Beyond that point, a new monetary regime, with a freely floating exchange rate, will become operative. So, in contrast with the nominal exchange rate target, the pricelevel target is hit only after some laps of time. By then, inflation and economic growth will have reached normal levels. That is the idea, as I understand it. Now, combining some equations in the paper, and assuming that foreign prices are on their steady-state level, gives for the actual real exchange rate:
which formally restates that the actual real exchange rate will depreciate as long as actual inflation (π t ) is below the target level (π ). Indeed, this is the initial phase of the plan. But the final part is that the real exchange rate must eventually appreciate to its steady-state level. And the private sector must expect this to occur. Otherwise, investors would massively supply rather than demand domestic currency from the very start, and the central bank would find itself in the situation of speculative attacks described in Chapter I of Svensson's paper, thereby "eventually risking running out of foreign-exchange reserves." Can this hazard be avoided? The answer is yes, provided that the public is convinced that the central bank will manage to eventually get actual inflation above the target level. For this is exactly what is needed for a real appreciation to occur in the final stage of the process, on the basis of the same equation (3). Hence, the central bank must be credible, its model must give an accurate description of the monetary transmission process, and the public-both inside and outside the country-must share this description. This requires, at the least, an unprecedented degree of transparency from the central bank.
In actual practice, credibility can be earned by showing that the strategy chosen turns out to be successful in the initial stage. This would imply that inflation and economic growth will pick up shortly after the plan has been implemented. Is this a likely scenario? My tentative answer is: it depends. More precisely, I suspect it depends on the monetary transmission mechanism. Let me try to show this. From the assumptions made by the author, it can be demonstrated that the expected rate of change in the real exchange rate for period t+1 is given by
We may safely assume that in the initial stage of the project, expected inflation will lag behind the target rate, so that the public will expect the real exchange rate to depreciate. As a result, aggregate demand is stimulated, by virtue of equation (1 
which is the real-term equivalence of equation (2). In other words, if the expected real exchange rate depreciates (that is, if q t +1 is expected to rise), the real short-term interest rate (r t ) will be high relative to its foreign counterpart (r * t ), and this will continue to be the case as long as the inflation target is not hit (by virtue of equation [4] In Svensson's analysis, however, there is only one long real interest rate, with the relevant maturity (T ) being sufficiently long to ensure that this rate will fall relative to its steady-state level.
Where does this all take us? First, the analysis by Svensson is correct in itself. So if economic reality conforms to his model, and abstracting from foreign retaliation (see below), the proposed recipe will work, provided that the central bank is credible. My concern is that in the initial stage of the project, real interest rates with limited maturities will rise rather than fall, notwithstanding the fact that very long real rates (as in Svensson's model) will fall. It follows that aggregate demand, which in actual practice reacts to the whole spectrum of real interest rates, may be partially depressed, at least initially, and it is not self-evident that this effect will be smaller in absolute size than the positive effect of the expected real depreciation. As a consequence, it is not a foregone conclusion that inflation will immediately rise. It may actually diminish at first, depending on the relevant impact multipliers. Whether or not this will happen, is a matter of empirical analysis, of course, but if the answer is yes, the central bank's credibility comes into play, which is crucial for the whole thing to work.
My second concern goes beyond the model and has already been elaborated by my colleague-commentator. A long-continued depreciation of the real exchange rate will significantly affect the economies of Japan's trading partners in terms of inflation, output growth, current account, etc. This is likely to invite countermeasures by these countries. It is clear that this may put a spoke in the wheel, and I am curious to hear how the proposed strategy could allow for this risk.
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General Discussion
In response to the skepticism expressed by Glenn Stevens and Job Swank, Lars E. O. Svensson reemphasized that his model was built on conventional and uncontroversial economic relations, in order to establish a foolproof way of escaping from the liquidity trap. Exactly by how much the yen should be devalued at the initial stage is not that important, as long as it ends up clearly below the equilibrium level. Given the importance of restoring aggregate demand in Japan for the stable growth of the world economy, it should not be difficult for trading partners to consent to a devaluation of the yen. Finally, credibility in the peg of the nominal exchange rate can be easily built, perhaps in just one week or so, given that the peg is technically feasible to maintain. In light of the inertia of deflation, it should take somewhat longer to turn deflation into inflation, perhaps a year or more. Donald L. Kohn noted that, at least in the initial stages, this proposal would have "beggar thy neighbor" effects, and added that it might be more easily accepted today, while it would have been impossible two years ago during the East Asian crisis. William R. White commented on the potential for coordination among policy makers and agreed that now would be an excellent opportunity to implement Svensson's proposal because aggregate demand is unsustainably high in the United States and the euro seems excessively weak relative to the yen.
Masaaki Shirakawa wondered if the proposal would not violate the IMF rules, which preclude devaluation for the purpose of stimulating the domestic economy. He also reflected on the experience of the Plaza Accord and the Louvre Accord to illustrate how difficult it is to maintain international policy coordination for a long time. Vítor Gaspar urged participants to take seriously the constraint deriving from the perception of "competitive devaluation" as "unfair."
In reply, Charles Collyns noted that the aim of the IMF's ban on nominal exchange rate devaluation for competitive purposes was to prevent "beggar thy neighbor" policies that might endanger the sound development of the world economy. The present issue over Japan is clearly not that case. Allan H. Meltzer pointed out that what is important is how quickly the real exchange rate of the yen, which stays above the equilibrium rate, could be adjusted without incurring costs of deflation. He felt sympathy for Svensson's proposal in that it should be a way to achieve this quickly. He also thought that a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate accompanied by this kind of adjustment does not constitute a "beggar thy neighbor" policy.
According to Kohn, there are two important caveats with regard to the credibility of the exchange rate peg: first, the effects of this proposal would depend upon the inflation rate of trading partners; and second, trading partners may respond by adopting easy-money policies. It would thus not be easy to build credibility of the nominal exchange rate peg, even if Japan were theoretically able to sell unlimited amounts of yen. Takamasa Hisada said that it would not be easy in practice to bring the nominal exchange rate to the target rate, because a large downward nudge to the yen would be politically difficult, while a small devaluation would only delay adjustment processes in a country like Japan, which is not that heavily dependent on trade: Japan is certainly not a textbook case of a "small country." Spencer Dale noted the problem of a central bank's balance-sheet expansion and possible losses due to intervention. Svensson responded that if the central bank would commit itself to unlimited intervention, the actual amount of intervention necessary for achieving the peg might not be that large, and the central bank's balance sheet might not expand greatly.
With respect to the effectiveness of the exchange rate channel, Hiroshi Fujiki pointed out that the cooperative solution for pegging the exchange rate should be obtained in a multiple-country model in which an improvement in economic welfare for the trading partner could be demonstrated. John B. Taylor agreed that simulations using a multiple-country model would be beneficial in evaluating this proposal, and said that his own calculations indicated that the elasticity of aggregate demand with regard to the exchange rate was so small that it would be inappropriate to expect too much from the exchange rate channel.
Georg Rich described Switzerland's experience with a temporary nominal exchange rate peg, noting that it is difficult to influence expectation formation unless the authorities commit to a permanent peg. He also urged caution that policies aiming at expanding external demand for the recovery of the economy would have considerable impact on the domestic industrial structure. Marvin Goodfriend and Christian Pfister commented that an increase in the uncertainty of inflation would raise the risk premium, which might, through uncovered interest rate arbitrage, raise real interest rates. Svensson, however, reemphasized that his model indicated that a rise in inflation expectations would result in a decline in long-term real interest rates. He also stressed that the proposal did not exclude other measures implemented at the same time; in particular, some other measures should be taken for coping with the financial crisis.
Tiff Macklem felt that "anchored expansion" was an attractive idea that integrates existing proposals of escaping from the liquidity trap, but doubted the robustness of a mechanism that was too heavily dependent on the movement of expectations regarding various variables, notably expected inflation rates. Goodfriend praised the proposal for providing a monetary solution (in the form of nominal exchange rate devaluation) to the monetary problem of the liquidity trap. However, he also expressed three reservations regarding (1) the risks inherent in the manipulation of inflation expectations, (2) the difficulty of coordination between the government and the central bank, and (3) the difficulty of forming a public consensus on the worsening of the terms of trade produced by currency devaluation. Fujiki noted the need to articulate in advance whether exogenous shocks would be better adjusted through the exchange rate channel or through the price level channel. Hisada questioned whether price level targeting would be able to deal with supplyside shocks such as the productivity gains achieved by advances in information and communication technologies.
Kazuo Ueda commented that Svensson was mistaken if he interpreted the BOJ's monetary policy stance as an unwillingness to implement policies the effects of which are uncertain. He added that any policy will have costs and benefits depending upon economic conditions at the time of its implementation, and it is necessary to choose the most appropriate one among the policy options available under the constraints, as pointed out by Goodfriend earlier. He concluded by stressing that the BOJ maintained the zero interest rate policy in light of all the costs involved.
